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Abstract
Deep networks are well-known to be fragile to adversarial attacks. We conduct an
empirical analysis of deep representations under the state-of-the-art attack method
called PGD, and find that the attack causes the internal representation to shift
closer to the “false” class. Motivated by this observation, we propose to regular-
ize the representation space under attack with metric learning to produce more
robust classifiers. By carefully sampling examples for metric learning, our learned
representation not only increases robustness, but also detects previously unseen
adversarial samples. Quantitative experiments show improvement of robustness
accuracy by up to 4% and detection efficiency by up to 6% according to Area
Under Curve score over prior work. The code of our work is available at https:
//github.com/columbia/Metric_Learning_Adversarial_Robustness.
1 Introduction
Deep networks achieve impressive accuracy and wide adoption in computer vision [17], speech
recognition [14], and natural language processing [21]. Nevertheless, their performance degrades
under adversarial attacks, where natural examples are perturbed with human-imperceptible, carefully
crafted noises [35, 23, 12, 18]. This degradation raises serious concern — especially when we
deploy deep networks to safety and reliability critical applications [29, 43, 41, 20, 36]. Extensive
efforts [37, 31, 47, 7, 25, 12, 35, 48] have been made to study and enhance the robustness of deep
networks against adversarial attacks, where a defense method called adversarial training achieves the
state-of-the-art adversarial robustness [19, 16, 46, 49].
To better understand adversarial attacks, we first conduct an empirical analysis of the latent representa-
tions under attack for both defended [19, 16] and undefended image classification models. Following
the visualization technique in [28, 30, 33], we investigate what happens to the latent representations
as they undergo attack. Our results show that the attack shifts the latent representations of adversarial
samples away from their true class and closer to the false class. The adversarial representations
often spread across the false class distribution in such a way that the natural images of the false class
become indistinguishable from the adversarial images.
Motivated by this empirical observation, we propose to add an additional constraint to the model
using metric learning [15, 32, 44] to produce more robust classifiers. Specifically, we add a triplet
loss term on the latent representations of adversarial samples to the original loss function. However,
the naïve implementation of triplet loss is not effective because the pairwise distances of a natural
sample xa, its adversarial sample x′a, and a randomly selected natural sample of the false class xn are
hugely uneven. Specifically, given considerable data variance in the false class, xn is often far from
the decision boundary where x′a resides, therefore xn is too easy as a negative sample. To address this
33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
00
90
0v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
8 O
ct 
20
19
problem, we sample the negative example for each triplet with the closest example in a mini-batch of
training data. In addition, we randomly select another sample xp in the correct class as the positive
example in the triplet data.
Our main contribution is a simple and effective metric learning method, Triplet Loss Adversarial
(TLA) training, that leverages triplet loss to produce more robust classifiers. TLA brings near both
the natural and adversarial samples of the same class while enlarging the margins between different
classes (Sec. 3). It requires no change to the model architecture and thus can improve the robustness
on most off-the-shelf deep networks without additional overhead during inference. Evaluation on
popular datasets, model architectures, and untargeted, state-of-the-art attacks, including projected
gradient descent (PGD), shows that our method classifies adversarial samples more accurately by up
to 4% than prior robust training methods [16, 19]; and makes adversarial attack detection [52] more
effective by up to 6% according to the Area Under Curve (AUC) score.
2 Related Work
The fact that adversarial noise can fool deep networks was first discovered by Szegedy et al. [35],
which started the era of adversarial attacks and defenses for deep networks. Goodfellow et al. [12]
then proposed an attack — fast gradient sign method (FGSM) and also constructed a defense model
by training on the FGSM adversarial examples. More effective attacks including C&W [5], PGD
[19], BIM [18], MIM [9], DeepFool [23], and JSMA [27] are proposed to fool deep networks, which
further encourage the research for defense methods.
Madry et al. [19] proposed adversarial training (AT) that dynamically trained the model on the
generated PGD attacks, achieving the first empirical adversarial robust classifier on CIFAR-10.
Since then, AT became the foundation for the state-of-the-art adversarial robust training method and
went through widely and densely scrutiny [3], which achieved real robustness without relying on
gradient masking [3, 13, 31, 4, 8]. Recently, Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) [16] is proposed with
an additional loss term that matches the logit feature from a clean image x and its corresponding
adversarial image x′, which further improves the adversarial robustness. However, this method has
a distorted loss function and is not scalable to untargeted attack [11, 22]. In contrast to the ALP
loss which uses a pair of data, our method introduces an additional negative example in a triplet of
data, which achieves more desirable geometric relationships between adversarial examples and clean
examples in feature metric space.
Orthogonal to our method, the concurrent feature denoising method [46] achieves the state-of-the-art
adversarial robustness on ImageNet. While their method adds extra denoising block in the model,
our method requires no change to the model architecture. Another concurrent work, TRADES [49],
achieves improved robustness by introducing Kullback-Leibler divergence loss to a pair of data. In
addition, unlabeled data [39] and model ensemble [37, 25] have been shown to improve the robustness
of the model. Future work can be explored by combining these methods with our proposed TLA
regularization for better adversarial robustness.
3 Qualitative Analysis of Latent Representations under Adversarial Attack
We begin our investigation by analyzing how the adversarial images are represented by different
models. We call the original class of an adversarial image as true class and the mis-predicted class of
adversarial example as false class. Figure 1 shows the visualization of the high dimensional latent
representation of sampled CIFAR-10 images with t-SNE [40, 2]. Here, we visualize the penultimate
fully connected (FC) layer of four existing models: standard undefended model (UM), model after
adversarial training (AT) [19], model after adversarial logit pairing (ALP) [16], and model after
our proposed TLA training. Though all the adversarial images belong to the same true class, UM
separates them into different false classes with large margins. The result shows UM is highly non-
robust against adversarial attacks because it is very easy to craft an adversarial image that will be
mistakenly classified into a different class. With AT and ALP methods, the representations are getting
closer together, but one can still discriminate them. Note that, a good robust model will bring the
representations of the adversarial images closer to their original true class so that it will be difficult to
discriminate the adversarial images from the original images. We will leverage this observation to
design our approach.
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Figure 1: t-SNE Visualization of adversarial images from the same true class which are mistakenly
classified to different false classes. The figure shows representations of second to last layer of 1000 adversarial
examples crafted from 1000 natural (clean) test examples from CIFAR-10 dataset, where the true class is “deer.”
The different colors represent different false classes. The gray dots further show 500 randomly sampled natural
deer images. Notice that for (a) undefended model (UM), the adversarial attacks clearly separate the images
from the same “deer” category into different classes. (b) adversarial training (AT) and (c) adversarial logit
pairing (ALP) method still suffer from this problem at a reduced level. In contrast, our proposed ATL (see (d))
clusters together all the examples from the same true class, which improves overall robustness.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the separation margin of adversarial examples from the natural images of the
corresponding false class. We show t-SNE visualization of the second to last layer representation of test data
from two different classes across four models. The blue and green dots are 200 randomly sampled natural
images from “bird" and “truck” classes respectively. The red triangles denote adversarial (adv) truck images
but mispredicted as “bird.” Notice that for (a) UM, the adversarial examples are moved to the center of the
false class, making it hard to separate from them. (b) AT and (c) ALP achieve some robustness by separating
adversarial and natural images, but they are still close to each other. Plot (d) shows our proposed TLA training
promotes the mispredicted adversarial examples to lie on the edge of the natural images false class and can still
be separated, which improves the robustness.
In Figure 2, we further analyze how the representation of images of one class is attacked into the
neighborhood of another class. The green and blue dots are the natural images of trucks and birds,
respectively. The red triangles are the adversarial images of trucks mispredicted as birds. For UM
model (Figure 2a), all the adversarial attacks successfully get into the center of the false class. The
AT and ALP models achieve some robustness by separating some adversarial images from natural
images, but most adversarial images are still inside the false class. A good robust model should
promote the representations of adversarial examples away from the false class, as shown in Figure 2d.
Such separation not only improves the adversarial classification accuracy but also helps to reject the
mispredicted adversarial attacks, because the mispredicted adversaries tend to lie on edge.
Based on these two observations, we build a new approach that ensures adversarial representations
will be (i) closer to the natural image representations of their true classes, and (ii) farther from the
natural image representations of the corresponding false classes.
4 Approach
Inspired by the adversarial feature space analysis, we add an additional constraint to the model using
metric learning. Our motivation is that the triplet loss function will pull all the images of one class,
both natural and adversarial, closer while pushing the images of other classes far apart. Thus, an
image and its adversarial counterpart should be on the same manifold, while all the members of the
false class should be forced to be separated by a large margin.
3
Notations. For an image classification task, let M be the number of classes to predict, and N be
the number of training examples. We formulate the deep network classifier as Fθ(x) ∈ RM as a
probability distribution, where x is the input variable, y is the output ground-truth, and θ is the
network’s parameters to learn (we simply use F (x) most of time); L(F (x), y) is the loss function.
Assume that an adversary is capable of launching adversarial attacks bounded by p-norm, i.e., the
adversary can perturb the input pixel by  bounded by Lp, p = 0, 2,∞, let I(x, ) denote the Lp
ball centered at x with radius . We focus on the study of untargeted attack, i.e., the objective is to
generate x′ ∈ I(x, ) such that F (x′) 6= F (x).
Triplet Loss. Triplet loss is a widely used strategy for metric learning. It trains on a triplet input{(
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are from different classes [32, 15].
x
(i)
p , x
(i)
a , and x
(i)
n are referred as positive, anchor, and negative examples of the triplet loss. The
embeddings are optimized such that examples of the same class are pulled together and the examples
of different classes are pushed apart by some margin [34]. The standard triplet loss for clean images
is as follows:
N∑
i
Ltrip(x(i)a ,x(i)p ,x(i)n ) =
N∑
i
[D(h(x(i)a ), h(x
(i)
p ))−D(h(x(i)a ), h(x(i)n )) + α]+
where, h(x) maps from the input x to the embedded layer, α ∈ R+ is a hyper-parameter for margin
and D(h(xi), h(xj)) denotes the distance between xi and xj in the embedded representation space.
In this paper, we define the embedding distance between two examples using the angular distance [42]:
D(h(x
(i)
a ), h(x
(j)
p,n)) = 1− |h(x
(i)
a )·h(x(j)p,n))|
||h(x(i)a )||2||h(x(j)p,n))||2
, where we choose to encode the information in the
angular metric space.
Metric Learning for Adversarial Robustness. We add triplet loss to the penultimate layer’s
representation. Different from standard triplet loss where all the elements in the triplet loss term are
clean images [32, 50], at least one element in the triplet loss under our setting will be an adversarial
image. Note that generating adversarial examples is more computational intensive compared with
just taking the clean images. For efficiency, we only generate one adversarial perturbed image for
each triplet data, using the same method introduced by Madry et al. [19]. Specifically, given a clean
image x(i), we generate the adversarial image x′(i) based on ∇xL(F (x), y) (standard loss without
the triplet loss) with PGD method. We do not add the triplet loss term into the loss of adversarial
example generation due to its inefficiency.
The other elements in the triplet data are clean images. We forward the triplet data in parallel through
the model and jointly optimize the cross-entropy loss and the triplet loss, which enables the model to
capture the stable metric space representation (triplet loss) with semantic meaning (cross-entropy
loss). The total loss function is formulated as follows:
Lall =
N∑
i
Lce(f(x′(i)a ), y(i)) + λ1Ltrip(h(x′(i)a )), h(x(i)p ), h(x(i)n )) + λ2Lnorm
Lnorm = ||h(x′(i)a )||2 + ||h(x(i)p )||2 + ||h(x(i)n )||2
(1)
where λ1 is a positive coefficient trading off the two losses; x
′(i)
a (anchor example) is an adversarial
counterpart based on x(i)a ; x
(i)
p (positive example) is a clean image from the same class of x
(i)
a ; x
(i)
n
(negative example) is a clean image from a different class; λ2 is the weight for the feature norm decay
term, which is also applied in [32] to reduce the L2 norm of the feature.
Notice that, besides the TLA set-up in equation 1, an adversarial perturbed image can be the positive
example, and a clean image can be the anchor example (i.e., switch the anchor and the positive),
where we refer it as TLA-SA (Sec 5). We choose the adversarial example as the anchor for TLA
according to the experimental result. Intuitively, the adversarial image is picked as the anchor because
it tends to be closer to the decision boundary between the "true" class and the "false" class. As an
anchor, the adversarial example is considered in both the positive pair and the negative pair, which
gives more-useful gradients for the optimization. The modified triplet loss for adversarial robustness
is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the triplet loss for adversarial robustness (TLA). The red circle is an adversarial
example, while the green and the blue circles are clean examples. The anchor and positive belong to the same
class. The negative (blue), from a different class, is the closest image to the anchor (red) in feature space. TLA
learns to pull the anchor and positive from the true class closer, and push the negative of false classes apart.
Negative Sample Selection. In addition to the anchor selection, the selection of the negative example
is crucial for the training process, because most of the negative examples are easy examples that
already satisfy the margin constraint of pairwise distance and thus contribute useless gradients
[32, 10]. Using the representation angular distance we predefine, we select negative samples as the
nearest images to the anchor from a false class. As a result, our model is able to learn to enlarge the
boundary between the adversarial samples and their closest negative samples from the other classes.
Unfortunately, finding the closest negative samples from the entire training set is computationally
intensive. Besides, using very hard negative examples have been found to decrease the network’s
convergence speed [32] significantly. Instead, we use a semi-hard negative example, where we
select the closest sample in a mini-batch. We demonstrate the advantage of this sampling strategy by
comparing it with the random sampling (TLA-RN). The results are shown in Sec 5. Other strategies of
sampling negative samples such as DAML [10] could also be applied here, which uses an adversarial
generator to exploit hard negative examples from easy ones.
Implementation Details. We apply our proposed triplet loss on the embedding of the penultimate
layer of the neural network for classification tasks. Since the following transformation only consists
of a linear layer and a softmax layer, small fluctuation to this embedding only brings monotonous
adjustment to the output controlled by some tractable Lipschitz constant [7, 24]. We do not apply
triplet loss on the logit layer but on the penultimate layer, because the higher dimensional penultimate
layer tends to preserve more information. We also construct two triplet loss terms on CIFAR-10 and
Tiny ImageNet, adding another positive example while reusing the anchor and negative example,
which achieves better performance [34, 6]. The details of the algorithm are introduced in Appendix
D.
5 Experiments
Experimental Setting. We validate our method on different model architectures across three popular
datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny-ImageNet. We compare the performance of our models with
the following baselines: Undefended Model (UM) refers to the standard training without adversarial
samples, Adversarial Training (AT) refers to the min-max optimization method proposed in [19],
Adversarial Logit Pairing (ALP) refers to the logit matching method which is currently the state-
of-the-art [16]. We use TLA to denote the triplet loss adversarial training mentioned in Section 4. To
further evaluate our design choice, we study two variants of TLA: Random Negative (TLA-RN),
which refers to our proposed triplet loss training method with a randomly sampled negative example,
and Switch Anchor (TLA-SA), which sets the anchor to be natural example and the positive to be
adversarial example (i.e., switching the anchor and the positive of our proposed method).
We conduct all of our experiments using TensorFlow v1.13 [1] on a single Tesla V100 GPU with a
memory of 16GB. We adopt the untargeted adversarial attacks during all of our training processes,
and evaluate the models with both white-box and black-box untargeted attacks instead of the targeted
attacks following the suggestions in [11] (a defense robust only to targeted adversarial attacks is
weaker than one robust to untargeted adversarial attacks). In order to be comparable to the original
paper in AT and ALP, we mainly evaluate the model under the L∞ bounded attacks. We also evaluate
the models under other norm-bounded attacks (L0, L2). The PGD and 20PGD in our Table 1 refer to
the PGD attacks with the random restart of 1 time and 20 times, respectively. For black-box (BB)
attacks, we use the transfer based method [26]. We set λ = 0.5 for ALP method as the original paper.
All the other implementation details are discussed in Appendix D.
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MNIST
Attacks Clean FGSM BIM C&W PGD PGD 20PGD MIM BB
(Steps) - (1) (40) (40) (40) (100) (100) (200) (100)
M
et
ho
ds
UM 99.20% 34.48% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 81.81%
AT 99.24% 97.31% 95.95% 96.66% 96.58% 94.82% 93.87% 95.47% 96.67%
ALP 98.91% 97.34% 96.00% 96.50% 96.62% 95.06% 94.93% 95.41% 96.95%
TLA-RN 99.50% 98.12% 97.17% 97.17% 97.64% 97.07% 96.73% 96.84% 97.69%
TLA-SA 99.44% 98.14% 97.08% 97.45% 97.50% 96.78% 95.64% 96.45% 97.65%
TLA 99.52% 98.17% 97.32% 97.25% 97.72% 96.96% 96.79% 96.64% 97.73%
CIFAR-10
Attacks Clean FGSM BIM C&W PGD PGD 20PGD MIM BB
(Steps) - (1) (7) (30) (7) (20) (20) (40) (7)
M
et
ho
ds
UM 95.01% 13.35% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7.60%
AT 87.14% 55.63% 48.29% 46.97% 49.79% 45.72% 45.21% 45.16% 62.83%
ALP 89.79% 60.29% 50.62% 47.59% 51.89% 48.50% 45.98% 45.97% 67.27%
TLA-RN 81.02% 55.41% 51.44% 49.66% 52.50% 49.94% 45.55% 49.63% 65.96%
TLA-SA 86.19% 58.80% 52.19% 49.64% 53.53% 49.70% 49.15% 49.29% 61.67%
TLA 86.21% 58.88% 52.60% 50.69% 53.87% 51.59% 50.03% 50.09% 70.63%
Tiny ImageNet
Attacks Clean FGSM BIM C&W PGD PGD 20PGD MIM BB
(Steps) - (1) (10) (10) (10) (20) (20) (40) (10)
M
et
ho
ds
UM 60.64% 1.15% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0% 0% 0% 9.99%
AT 44.77% 21.99 19.59% 17.34% 19.79% 19.44% 19.25% 19.28% 27.73%
ALP 41.53% 21.53% 20.03% 16.80% 20.18% 19.96% 19.76% 19.85% 30.31%
TLA-RN 42.11% 21.47% 20.03% 17.00% 20.05% 19.93% 19.81% 19.91% 30.18%
TLA-SA 41.43% 22.09% 20.77% 17.28% 20.82% 20.63% 20.50% 20.61% 29.96%
TLA 40.89% 22.12% 20.77% 17.48% 20.89% 20.71% 20.47% 20.69% 29.98%
Table 1: Classification accuracy under 8 different L∞ bounded untargeted attacks on MNIST (L∞ =0.3),
CIFAR-10 (L∞ =8/255), and Tiny-ImageNet (L∞ =8/255). The best results of each column are in bold and the
empirical lower bound (the lowest accuracy of each row if any) for each method is underlined. TLA improves the
adversarial accuracy by up to 1.86%, 4.12% , and 0.84% on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Tiny ImageNet respectively.
5.1 Effect of TLA on Robust Accuracy
MNIST consists of a training set of 55,000 images (excluding the 5000 images for validation as in
[19]) and a testing set of 10,000 images. We use a variant of LeNet CNN architecture which has
batch normalization for all the methods. The details of network architectures and hyper-parameters
are summarized in Appendix C. We adopt the L∞ = 0.3 bounded attack during the training and
evaluation. We generate adversarial examples using PGD with 0.01 step size for 40 steps during
the training. In addition, we conduct different types of L∞ = 0.3 bounded attacks to achieve good
evaluations. The adversarial classification accuracy of different models under various adversarial
attacks is shown in Table 1. As shown, we improve the empirical state-of-the-art adversarial accuracy
by up to 1.86% on 20PGD attacks (100 steps PGD attacks with 20 times of random restart), along
with 0.28% improvement on the clean data.
CIFAR-10 consists of 32×32×3 color images in 10 classes, with 50k images for training and 10k
images for testing. We follow the same wide residual network architecture and the same hyper-
parameters settings as AT [19]. As shown in Table 1, our method achieves up to 4.12% adversarial
accuracy improvement over the baseline methods under the strongest 20PGD attacks (20 steps PGD
attack with 20 times of restart). Note that our method results in a minor decrease of standard accuracy,
but such loss of generic accuracy is observed in all the existing robust training models [38, 49]. The
comparison with TLA-RN illustrates the effectiveness of the negative sampling strategy. According
to the result of the TLA-SA, our selection of the adversarial example as the anchor also achieves
better performance than the method which chooses the clean image as the anchor.
Tiny Imagenet is a tiny version of ImageNet consisting of color images with size 64×64×3 belonging
to 200 classes. Each class has 500 training images and 50 validation images. Due to the GPU limit,
we adapt the ResNet 50 architectures for the experiment. We adopt L∞ = 8/255 for both training
and validation. During training, we use 7 step PGD attack with step size 2/255 to generate the
adversarial samples. As shown in Table 1, our proposed model achieves higher adversarial accuracy
under white box adversarial attacks by up to 0.84% on MIM attacks.
6
Mini-Batch TT (s) Total TT (s) Clean FGSM(1) BIM(7) C&W(30) PGD(20) MIM(40)
N
eg
at
iv
e
Si
ze 1 0 1.802 81.02% 55.41% 51.44% 49.66% 49.94% 49.63%
250 0.467 2.259 86.38% 59.05% 53.02% 50.49% 50.71% 50.31%
500 0.908 2.688 88.32% 60.02% 53.20% 51.30% 50.46% 50.07%
1000 1.832 3.621 86.71% 59.08% 53.25% 50.88% 51.22% 50.74%
2000 3.548 5.992 87.45% 59.23% 52.52% 50.57% 50.20% 49.79%
Table 2: The effect of mini-batch size of negative samples on training time (TT) per iteration and
adversarial robustness (L∞ = 8/255) on CIFAR-10 dataset. The best results of each column are
shown in bold. The number of steps for each attack is shown in the parenthesis. The training time
grows linearly as the size of the mini-batch grows. The adversarial robustness peaks at size 500 to
1000, which validate that semi-hard negative examples are crucial for TLA.
MNIST (LeNet) CIFAR-10 (WRN)
Attacks JSMA (L0) PGD (L2) C&W (L2) DeeoFool (L2) JSMA(L0) PGD (L2) C&W (L2) DeeoFool (L2)
M
et
ho
ds AT 99.08% 96.61% 99.08% 99.13% 40.4% 36.8% 50.0% 67.7%
ALP 98.83% 96.28% 98.91% 98.95% 36.9% 38.6% 51.2% 43.5%
TLA 99.32% 97.38% 99.36% 99.35% 48.6% 41.1% 53.5% 80.8%
Table 3: Classification accuracy of two baseline methods and TLA method on 4 unseen types of
attacks (L0 and L2 norm bounded). All the models are only trained on the L∞ bounded attacks. The
best results of each column are shown in bold. TLA improves the adversarial accuracy by up to
1.10% and 13.1% on MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset respectively. The results demonstrate that TLA
generalizes better to unseen types of attacks.
Effect of the mini-batch size of negative samples of TLA. Compared with retrieving from the
whole dataset, the mini-batch based method can mitigate the computational overhead by finding the
nearest neighbor from a batch rather than from the whole training set. The size of the mini-batch
size controls the hardness level of the negative samples, where larger mini-batch size makes harder
negative ones. We train models with different mini-batch size and evaluate the robustness of the
model using five untargeted, L∞ bounded attacks. As shown in Table 2, the total training time grows
linearly as the size of the mini-batch increases, which triples for size 2000 compared with size 1. The
adversarial robustness first increases and then decreases after the mini-batch size reaches 1000 (very
hard negative examples hurt performance). Being consistent with the observation in standard metric
learning [32, 51], our results show that it is important to train TLA with semi-hard negative examples
by choosing the proper mini-batch size.
Generalization to Unseen Types of Attacks. After training the models, both baselines and ours,
with L∞ bounded attacks, we evaluate them on unseen L0-bounded [27] and L2-bounded attacks [23,
5, 19, 5]. We set L0 = 0.1 and L0 = 0.02 bound for JSMA on MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset
respectively. For L2 norm bounded PGD and C&W attacks, we set the bound as L2 = 0.1 and
L2 = 32 on MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively. We apply 40 steps of PGD and C&W on MNIST,
and 10 steps of PGD and C&W on CIFAR-10. We apply 2 steps for DeepFool attack for both
dataset. Due to the slow speed of JSMA, we only run 1000 test samples on CIFAR-10. Table 3 shows
that TLA improves the adversarial accuracy by up to 1.10% and 13.1% on MNIST and CIFAR-10
respectively, which demonstrates that TLA generalizes better to unseen attacks than baseline models.
Performance on Different Model Architectures. To demonstrate that TLA is general for different
model architectures, we conduct experiments using multi-layer perceptron (MLP) and ConvNet [47]
architectures. Results in Table 4 show that TLA achieves better adversarial robustness by up to 4.27%
and 0.55% on MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively.
MNIST (MLP) Cifar10 (ConvNet)
Attacks Clean FGSM BIM C&W PGD Clean FGSM BIM C&W PGD
Steps - 1 40 40 100 - 1 7 30 20
M
et
ho
ds
UM 98.27% 5.23% 0% 0% 0% 77.84% 3.50% 0.09% 0.08% 0.03%
AT 96.43% 73.25% 57.83% 62.60% 58.10% 67.60% 40.26% 36.34% 33.17% 34.83%
ALP 95.56% 77.08% 64.39% 63.46% 64.13% 66.18% 39.45% 36.15% 32.55% 35.32%
TLA 97.15% 78.44% 65.47% 67.73% 65.88% 67.48% 40.76% 36.77% 33.27% 35.38%
Table 4: Effect of TLA on different neural network architectures. The table lists classification accuracy
under various L∞ bounded untargeted attacks on MNIST (L∞ = 0.3) and Cifar10 (L∞ = 8/255).
Overall, TLA improves adversarial accuracy.
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5.2 Effect of TLA on Adversarial vs. Natural Image Separation
Recall in Figure 2b and Figure 2c, the representations of adversarial images are shifted toward the
false class. A robust model should separate them apart. To quantitatively evaluate how well TLA
training helps with separating the adversarial examples from the natural images of the corresponding
‘false’ classes, we define the following metric.
Let {cik} denote the embedded representations of all the natural images from class ck, where
i = 1, . . . , |ck|, and |ck| is the total number of images in class ck. Then, the average pairwise within-
class distance of these embedded images is: σntrlck =
2
|ck|(|ck|−1)
∑|ck|−1
i=1
∑|ck|
j=i+1D(c
i
k, c
j
k). Let
{c′qk } further denote embedded representations of all the adversarial examples that are misclassified
to class ck, where q = 1, . . . , |c′k|, and |c′k| is the total number of such examples. Note that, class ck
is the ‘false’ class to those adversarial images. Then, the distance between an adversarial images c
′i
k
and a natural image cjk is: D(c
′i
k , c
j
k), and the average pair-wise distance between adversary image
and natural images is: σ
′adv
ck
= 1|c′k||ck|
∑|c′k|
i=1
∑|ck|
j=1D(c
′i
k , c
j
k). We then define the ratio rck =
σadvck
σntrlck
as a metric to evaluate how close the adversarial images are w.r.t. the natural images of the ‘false’
class while compared with the average pairwise within-class distance of all the natural images of
that class. Finally, for all classes we compute the average ratio as r = 1M
∑M
k=1(rck). Note that, any
good robust method should increase the value of r, indicating σadv is far from σntrl, i.e., they are
better separated than the natural cluster, as shown in Figure 2d.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 Tiny ImageNet
Perturbation Level L∞ = 0.03 L∞ = 0.3 L∞ = 8255 L∞ =
25
255 L∞ =
8
255 L∞ =
25
255
M
et
ho
ds AT 1.288 1.308 1.053 1.007 0.9949 0.9656
ALP 1.398 1.394 1.038 1.210 0.9905 0.9722
TLA 1.810 1.847 1.093 1.390 0.9937 0.9724
Table 5: Average Ratio (r) of mean distance between adversary points and natural points over the mean
intra-class distance. The best results of each column are in bold. The results illustrate that TLA increases the
relative distance of adversarial images w.r.t. the natural images of the respective false classes, which illustrates
that TLA achieves more desirable geometric feature space under attacks.
For every dataset, we estimate the ratios under two different perturbation levels of PGD attacks for
all the models. As shown in Table 5, stronger attacks (larger perturbation level) tend to shift their
latent representation more toward the false class. For Tiny-ImageNet, the adversarial examples are
even closer (r < 1) to the false class’s manifold than the corresponding natural images to themselves,
which explains the low adversarial accuracy on this dataset. In almost all the settings, TLA leads to
higher r values of separation than the other baseline methods. This indicates TLA is most effective in
pulling apart the misclassified adversary examples from their false class under both small and large
perturbations attacks.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 Tiny-ImageNet
Type Adv Natural Adv Natural Adv Natural
M
et
ho
d AT 93.01% 98.68% 47.46% 87.06% 20.20% 36.6%
ALP 95.20% 98.43% 48.85% 89.63% 20.33% 35.23%
TLA 96.98% 99.47% 51.74% 86.29% 20.72% 33.99%
Table 6: Accuracy of K-Nearest Neighbors classifier with K = 50, illustrating TLA has better similarity
measures in embedding space even with adversarial samples. The best results of each column are in bold.
We further conduct the nearest neighbor analysis on the latent representations across all the models.
The results illustrate the advantage of our learned representations for retrieving the nearest neighbor
under adversarial attacks (See Figure 4). Table 6 numerically shows that the latent representation of
TLA achieves higher accuracy using K-Nearest Neighbors classifier than baseline methods.
5.3 Effect of TLA on Adversarial Image Detection
Detecting mis-predicted adversarial inputs is another dimension to improve a model’s robustness.
Forward these detected adversarial examples to humans for labeling can significantly improve the
reliability of the system under adversarial cases. Given that TLA separates further the adversarial
examples from the natural examples of the false class, we can detect more mis-classified examples by
filtering out the outliers. We conduct the following experiments.
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AT
Query (Clean) Nearest Neighbors Retrieved
TLA
Nearest Neighbors RetrievedQuery (Adv)
(Baseline)
(Ours)
Figure 4: Visualization of nearest neighbor images while querying about a “plane" on AT and TLA trained
models. For a natural query image, both methods retrieve correct images (left column). However, given an
adversarial query image (right column), the AT retrieves false “truck" images indicating the perturbation moves
the representation of the “plane" into the neighbors of “truck," while TLA still retrieves images from the true
"plane" class.
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(c) Tiny ImageNet
Figure 5: The ROC curve and AUC scores of detecting mis-classified adversarial examples. We train a GMM
model on half clean and half adversarial examples (generated with perturbation level  = 0.03/1(40 steps)
for MNIST,  = 8/255(7 steps) for CIFAR-10, and  = 8/255(7 steps) for Tiny-ImageNet), and then test
the detection model on 10k natural test images and 10k adversary test images (generated with perturbation
level  = 0.3/1(100 steps) for MNIST,  = 25/255(20 steps) for CIFAR-10, and  = 25/255(30 steps) for
Tiny-ImageNet). The numerical results for AUC score are shown in the legend. Note that both the ROC curve of
TLA is on the top and the AUC score of TLA is the highest, which shows TLA (our method) achieves higher
detection efficiency for adversarial examples.
Following the adversarial detection method proposed in [52], we train a Gaussian Mixture Model
for 10 classes where the density function of each class is captured by one Gaussian distribution. For
each test image, we assign a confidence score of a class based on the Gaussian distribution density of
the class at that image, as shown in [45]. We assign these confidence scores for all the 10 classes
for each test image. We then pick the class with the largest confidence value as the assigned class of
the image. We further rank all the test images based on the confidence value of their assigned class.
We reject those with lower confidence scores below a certain threshold. This method serves as an
additional confidence metric to detect adversarial examples in a real-world setting.
We conduct the detection experiment for mis-classified images on 10k clean images and 10k adver-
sarial images. As shown in Figure 5, the ROC-curves and AUC score demonstrate that our learned
representations are superior in adversarial example detection. Compared with other robust training
models, TLA improves the AUC score by up to 3.69%, 6.45%, and 1.37% on MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and Tiny ImageNet respectively. The detection results here are consistent with the visual results
shown in Figure 2.
6 Conclusion
Our novel TLA regularization is the first method that leverages metric learning for adversarial
robustness on deep networks, which significantly increases the model robustness and detection
efficiency. TLA is inspired by the evidence that the model has distorted feature space under adversarial
attacks. In the future, we plan to enhance TLA using more powerful metric learning methods, such
as the N-pair loss. We believe TLA will also be beneficial for other deep network applications that
desire a better geometric relationship in hidden representations.
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Supplementary material for “Metric
Learning for Adversarial Robustness”
A Indiscrimination of Robust Representation of Adversarial Examples and
the True Class
Similar to Fig. 1 in the main text, we visualize the representations of clean and adversarial examples from the
same class for the remaining 9 classes on CIFAR-10 dataset across all models using t-SNE [[2]]. Visualizations
are shown in Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8.
Figure 6: t-SNE Visualizations of adversarial images from the same true class which are mistakenly
classified to false classes. From left to right: UM, AT, ALP, TLA. These are representations of second to last
layer of 1000 adversarial examples crafted from 1000 clean test examples from CIFAR-10 dataset, where the
true class is the same for all the figures in the same row and different for figures of different row. The different
colors represent different false classes. The gray dots further show 500 randomly sampled clean true images.
Notice that for (a) undefended model (UM), the adversarial attacks clearly separate the images from the true
category into different classes. (b) adversarial training (AT) and (c) adversarial logit pairing (ALP) method still
suffer from this problem at a reduced level. In contrast, proposed ATL (see (d)) clusters together all the examples
from the same true class, which improves overall robustness.
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B Separation of Robust Representations of Adversarial Examples to the
False Class
Similar to Fig. 2 in the main text, we provide more visualizations of the representations on CIFAR-10 using
t-SNE to demonstrate the separation margin of adversarial samples to the corresponding false class. We plot the
representations of adversarial examples from class A which are finally misclassified as class B. We also plot
clean images from both A and B. Visualizations are shown in Fig. 9, Fig. 10, and Fig. 11.
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Figure 7: t-SNE Visualizations of adversarial images from the same true class which are mistakenly
classified to different false classes (Same as Fig 6).
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C Experiment
C.1 Implementation Details
We add uniform random noise to the clean images x within the I(x, ) corresponding to the allowed perturbation
scale for the natural images in the TLA training. We conduct all the experiments using a single V100 GPU with
16GB memory. The black-box attack is evaluated Code is appended in the zip file.
MNIST follows the setup of Madry et al. [19] and ALP [16], we use Adam with learning rate of 0.0001. For
ALP, we use λ = 0.5 as suggested in papers [16]. We conduct experiments using our modified LeNet model
(adding the batch normalization and replace 5× 5 convolution kernel with 3× 3). The architecture is shown in
Table 7. All experiments are conducted with batch size 50. To be consistent with the results reported by ALP,
we maintain the label smoothing with value equals to 0.1. We achieve better accuracy for AT [19] and ALP
[16] (The baselines are stronger than the original paper because of the additional label smoothing and batch
normalization). We set up the experiment we reported in the table with the following hyper-parameters. For
the TLA method, we adopt λ1 = 0.5, λ2 = 0.001, margin α = 0.05, mini-batch size for the negative sample
selection as 50. We run the experiments for 200 epochs before it fully converges. We repeat the experiments
for five times and observe little oscillations for the performance. We select the one randomly with middle-level
performance and conduct all the evaluations above.
CIFAR10 follows the same WRN model as Madry et al [19] across all our models, as shown in Table 8. Also,
we adopt the same SGD optimization method with the same learning rate decay strategy as Madry’s, where
we start with learning rate of 0.1 and decrease it to 0.01 at 50k iterations. We run it for 55k iterations before
stopping. We train all the models with a batch size of 50. We implement the ALP on CIFAR-10 because it is not
implemented in the original ALP paper, where we do improve the adversarial accuracy significantly. To achieve
a fair comparison, we all follow the hyper-parameters set-up in [19]. It took a day and a half before our training
converges. We set the λ = 0.5 for ALP and do not use label smoothing. For TLA method, we adopt λ1 = 2,
λ2 = 0.001, margin α = 0.03, mini-batch size for the negative sample selection as 500. Our TLA improves the
robust accuracy over ALP baseline for 4.12% and AT baseline for 4.82%.
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Figure 8: t-SNE Visualizations of adversarial images from the same true class which are mistakenly
classified to different false classes (Same as Fig 6).
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Figure 9: Illustration of the separation margin of adversarial examples from the natural images of the
corresponding false class. From left to right: UM, AT, ALP, TLA. We show t-SNE visualization of the
second to last layer representation of test data from two different classes across four models. The blue and
green dots are 200 randomly sampled natural images from ”frog” and ”horse” classes respectively. The red
triangles denote adversarial (adv) perturbed ”frog” images but mispredicted as ”horse”. Notice that for (a) UM,
the adversarial examples are moved to the center of the false class which is hard to separate from the natural
images of the false class. (b) AT and (c) ALP achieve some robustness by separating adversarial and false natural
images, but they are still close to each other. Plot (d) shows proposed TLA promotes the mispredicted adversarial
examples to lie on edge and can still be separated from natural images of the false class, which improves the
robustness.
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Tiny-ImageNet follows the well studied Resnet-50 model. We apply a stride of 2 for the first convolution to
reduce the computational intensity. We use the Adam optimizer for AT and ALP trained with batch size of 32.
We start from learning rate of 0.1 and decrease the learning rate to 0.01 at the 110-th epochs and 0.001 at the
130th epochs. We train it for 150 epochs. For TLA training, we fintuning on the AT model with batch-size of
20 because of GPU memory budget. We use the untargeted attacks for the adversarial examples generation
during both the training and testing procedure, so that it is consistent with the attack conducted in the evaluation.
We use data augmentation (crop, flip, saturation, etc.) for all the models. The training time for the models
requires about 2 days on a single Nvidia V100 GPU. We set the λ = 0.5 for ALP. We use label smoothing with
parameter equal to 0.1 across all of our experiments. For the TLA method, we adopt λ1 = 0.2, λ2 = 0.001,
margin α = 0.01, mini-batch size for the negative sample selection as 50.
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Figure 10: Same as Fig 9 except the two classes are ”horse” and ”airplane”.
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Figure 11: Same as Fig 9 except the two classes are ”horse” and ”airplane”.
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C.2 Effect of TLA on Bring Adversarial vs. Natural Image of the Same Class Together
We also define a similar metric to show TLA tends to pull closer the adversary images to their true class. For
every dataset, we compute a complementary ratio (denoted as r′) that measures how adversary images are
pulled back to their true class on different models. We reformulate the definition of {c′qk } to be the embedded
representations of all the adversarial examples crafted based on the clean images of true class ck in the test set.
The results are shown in Table 9. Notice that lower value of r′ is desirable here, indicating the examples of the
same class are pulled together.
Table 7: Illustration of MNIST architecture, which shows all the details of our modified LeNet
Architecture by using smaller Convolution (Conv) kernels and batch normalization. Where the
Feature-In/Out for the convolution and fully connected (FC) denotes the number of the channel and
hidden neurons respectively.
Layer Type Feature-In Dimension Feature-Out Dimension Kernel-Size
Conv 1 32 3× 3
BatchNormalization 32 32 -
ReLU - - -
Conv 32 64 3× 3
BatchNormalization 64 64 -
ReLU - - -
Max Pooling 2× 2
Conv 64 128 3× 3
BatchNormalization 128 128 -
ReLU - - -
Conv 128 256 3× 3
BatchNormalization 256 256 -
ReLU - - -
Max Pooling 2× 2
Fully Connected 7× 7× 256 1024 -
BatchNormalization 1024 1024 -
ReLU - -
Fully Connected 1024 10 -
Softmax
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Table 8: Illustration of wide residual network architecture which is the same as Madry et al. [19].
The matrix denotes the set up of the residual block, and × denotes to repeat this for the following
number of times.
layer name output size layer setup
Conv 32× 32 3× 3, 16, stride 1
conv2_x 16× 16
[
3× 3, 160
3× 3, 160
]
× 6
conv3_x 8× 8
[
3× 3, 320
3× 3, 320
]
× 6
conv4_x 4× 4
[
3× 3, 640
3× 3, 640
]
× 6
classifier 1× 1 average pool, 10-d fc, softmax
As we can see, adversarial attack tends to bring the representation of an image far away from its true class.
For UM, the adversarial examples are far away from the clean examples of the same class. With AT and ALP
(baseline) methods, the adversarial examples are getting closer to the clean images of the true class to some
extent. Our method TLA brings even closer the adversarial examples to the clean examples on CIFAR-10
and Tiny-ImageNet and achieves comparable performance on MNIST. This further implies that our method
promotes the adversarial and clean images from the same class to lie on the same manifold and thus improves
the robustness of the model.
Table 9: Average (over all classes) ratio (r′) of the mean of pairwise distance between adversary images and
natural images of the same class over the mean inner-class distance. The results illustrate that TLA decreases the
relative distance of adversarial images w.r.t. the natural images of the respective true classes. The best results of
each column are in bold.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 Tiny-ImageNet
Perturbation Level L∞ = 0.03 L∞ = 0.3 L∞ = 8255 L∞ =
25
255 L∞ =
8
255 L∞ =
25
255
M
et
ho
ds
UM 1.071 2.159 3.604 3.682 1.319 1.480
AT 1.004 1.042 1.342 1.714 1.053 1.204
ALP 1.006 1.068 2.313 3.796 1.040 1.151
TLA 1.005 1.072 1.191 1.491 1.044 1.174
D TLA Algorithm
The Triplet Loss Adversarial Training (TLA) is introduced in the Algorithm 1. It is a simple approach which can
be done within one Loop.
Algorithm 1 Metric Learning for Adversarial Robustness (Triplet Loss Adversarial (TLA) method)
1: Input: Data D = {(x(i), y(i)}Ni=1, training iterations Tt, learning rate ρt, initialized
trainable model parameters θ. A minibatch of size K for each iteration is denoted as
{(X(k), Y (k))}k∈{i1,...,iK}.
2: for t = 1 : Tt do
3: Sample a minibatch of data X and Xpos of the same class from D
4: Generate adversarial attack images Xadv based on X.
5: Sample a subset of data Xextra and calculate a negative minibatch X−negcorresponding to
Xadv with strategy mentioned in section 3.2.
6: Calculate Lall (as defined in Sec 4.2) on the sampled batches.
7: Update parameters: θ ← θ − ρt
∑
k ∇θLall.
8: end for
E The effect of the hyper-parameter
We use MNIST dataset to explore the influence of the hyper-parameters. We conclude that a higher accuracy is
usually achieved with a margin between 0.01 to 0.1, the weight λ should be between 0.5 to 2. The results for
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different margin and λ plot in the following graph. Overall, our TLA algorithm does not sensitive to the specific
hyper-parameters set up. In a wide range, it is able to achieve significant improvement over the baseline models.
Table 10: Adversarial accuracy under 100 steps of PGD attack when model is trained using different
λ1 parameters on MNIST. We conclude that setting the λ1 within range of 0.5 to 2 is all reasonable.
λ 0 0.025 0.5 1 2 4
TLA 94.82% 96.31% 96.96% 96.57% 96.72% 96.26%
Table 11: Adversarial accuracy under 100 steps of PGD attack with λ1 = 2 when model is trained
using different α parameter on MNIST. The best accuracy is achieved with margin 0.05 according to
our experiment.
α 0 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.2
TLA 96.60% 96.47% 96.72% 96.36% 96.35%
Table 12: Adversarial robustness accuracy under 100 steps of PGD of model trained on different
representation layers with ATL on MNIST. All the models using λ1 = 2.The result demonstrate our
choice of the second to last layer achieve the best performance.
Representation Layer Lower Middle Higher (Ours) Logit (ALP)
TLA 96.14% 96.48% 96.72% 96.34%
F Visualization
F.1 More Visualization of the Nearest Neighbor Retrival on Learned Embeddings
We show more visualizations of the nearest neighbor retrieval based on the representation learned on different
methods. The results are shown in Fig 12.
F.2 Visualization of the Loss Landscape
To demonstrate that our approach does not rely on the obfuscated gradients by having a distorted loss landscape
[11], we visualize the loss landscape of the loss function on two random directions in Fig 13.
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Figure 12: Visualization of nearest neighbor images while querying about a "deer" on models
using AT, ALP, and TLA training separately. The clean image query is shown on the left column,
and the adversarial perturbed image query is shown on the right column. As we can see, while both
baseline methods are unable to retrieve the correct nearest neighbors under adversarial attacks, our
TLA method (bottom) retrieve the correct images.
AT
ALP
TLA
Image1 Image2 Image3
Figure 13: Visualization of loss landscape of each model of Tiny ImageNet. We visualize the loss
using heatmap of three randomly sampled example (each column has the same direction). For each
line, we show the result of baseline methods and our methods. As we can see, TLA (last row) has a
slightly smoother loss landscape compared with AT and ALP baselines.
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